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We build a general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition with moral hazard contracting
to examine the interactions among skill-biased technological change (SBTC), organizational changes,
and skill premium and within-group wage inequality. While the existing literature nds that the
increase in the skilled labor ratio induces SBTC and raises the skill premium, we show that SBTC
leads to organizational change toward decentralization by delegating authority within rms, which
inuences the reward schedule for delegated skilled managers. This organizational change results
in the following: (1) the further increase in the skill premium and (2) the rapid expansion of wage
inequality among skilled individuals (between skilled workers and skilled managers). Moreover, we
nd that there are multiple equilibria where the centralized and decentralized organizational modes
simultaneously emerge at the intermediate values of the skilled labor ratio.
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1 Introduction
Firms in many developed countries have experienced drastic changes in their organizational forms over
the past decades. One of the most prominent features of these changes is a trend toward decentralization
by delegating decision-making authority. Along with organizational changes, wage inequality has grown
in many developed countries, while the implication of this organizational change for individual wages have
however remained largely unexplored thus far. The overall wage inequality has grown in the U.S. since
the 1980s, and similar trends have been observed in other developed countries.1 A major contributor to
rising overall inequality is the skill premium, or dierentials between the wages of college degree and high
school diploma holders.2 Despite a remarkable increase in the supply of college skills, the skill premium
has steadily increased in the U.S. since the 1980s. However, observable characteristics, such as education
and work experience, have been found to explain no more than half of the variation in wages. Thus,
wage dispersion within the same demographic and skill group is also a major component of the increased
dispersion in overall wage inequality.3
Few studies have been conducted on understanding the interaction between recent organizational
change and growing wage inequality. To provide a unied explanation for this issue, we build a simple
general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition with moral hazard contracting by extending
Acemoglu (2002b). A large body of literature documents that skill-biased technological change (SBTC)
plays a prominent role in explaining this widening wage inequality. Acemoglu's (2002b) seminal research
provides excellent explanations for why SBTC is likely to have accelerated over the past several decades.
He argues that the large increase in the supply of college-educated labor since the 1970s in the U.S.
expands the market size of skill-biased technology, which provides greater incentives for rms to develop
and adopt such technologies. Such a SBTC responding to the supply of skills results in the acceleration
of the demand for skills and the increase in the skill premium.4 On the one hand, we follow Acemoglu
(2002b) in that the increase in the skilled labor ratio leads to a SBTC that is represented by the increase
in the variety of intermediate goods, which improves the productivity of skilled labor, increases the
demand for skilled workers, and raises the skill premium. On the other hand, we deviate from Acemoglu
1See, for example, Autor et al. (2008) on the U.S., Haskel and Slaughter (2002) on the U.K. and Dustmann et al. (2009)
on Germany.
2Precise denitions of \skill premium" and \within-group inequality" appear in Section 2.
3See, for example, Acemoglu (2002a).
4More precisely, Acemoglu (2002b) shows that the increase in skilled labor supply provides two competing impacts
upon the direction of the technical change: the price eect and the market size eect. While the former eect encourages
innovations directed at scarce unskilled labor, the latter eect leads to SBTC . Acemoglu derives the conditions for SBTC
and the widening of the skill premium.
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(2002b) in that we focus on organizational changes within rms and the corresponding changes in the
reward schedule for delegated skilled managers, which causes a skill premium and wage inequality within
the skilled group.
We show that the increase in the skill premium that is caused by SBTC leads to an organizational
change from the centralized mode, in which the rm owner maintains authority, to the decentralized
mode, in which the rm owner delegates the authority to a skilled manager. This organizational change
and the corresponding change in the reward schedule for skilled managers results in (1) a further increase
in the skill premium and (2) a rapid expansion of wage inequality among skilled individuals (between
skilled workers and skilled managers). A recent empirical study by Autor et al. (2008) nd that the bulk
of the widening wage inequality in the U.S. is concentrated in the upper tail of the wage distribution
and that there is a similar pattern in terms of residual wage inequality. Further, Caroli and Van Reenen
(2001) and Bresnahan et al. (2002) empirically show that SBTC aects the wage structure primarily
through organizational changes in the work place. Our result, in which the organizational decentralization
complements the appreciation of the skill premium and the wage inequality within the skilled group,
could provide an explanation for these empirical ndings. Moreover, we show that there are multiple
equilibria in which both the centralized and decentralized modes simultaneously emerge at intermediate
values of the skilled labor ratio. The presence of multiple equilibria implies that the proportion of rms
that adopt the decentralized mode can vary, even among countries that have similar skilled labor ratios
or technological conditions. An empirical study by Bloom et al. (2009) nd that there are signicant
dierences in the proportion of rms that adopt the decentralized mode, even among developed economies
with similar skilled labor ratios or technological conditions. Bloom et al. (2009) argue that cultural
factors, such as religion and regional trust, play crucial roles in accounting for cross-regional dierences
in the organizational mode within rms. The multiple equilibria that we found could explain this
empirical observation of organizational diversity.
In related research that studies the relationship between organizational change and wage inequality,
Nikolowa (2010) focuses on a skill-biased organizational change rather than a SBTC as a source of the
increases in the skill premium. She shows that the increasing supply of skilled labor leads rms to adopt
organizational forms that are less hierarchical, and this organizational change increases the demand for
skilled labor and results in a surge of the skill premium. Although similar to Nikolowa (2010), this paper
focuses on the interaction between organizational change and wage inequality. We also consider the
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surge of wage inequality within the skilled group.5 Other papers close to ours are Kremer and Maskin
(1996) and Acemoglu (1999). These papers nd that the increasing supply of skilled labor qualitatively
modies the composition of jobs by aecting a rm's decision to adopt skill-demanding technology. In
our model, the increase in the supply of skilled labor alters the allocation of decision making authority
within the rm rather than the decision to adopt. This paper also relates to that of Ishiguro (2010a),
who incorporates a rm's choice of organizational mode for the allocation of internal decision making
authority into a search theoretic model. He shows that centralized and decentralized organizations can
coexist as multiple equilibria.6 This paper incorporates a choice of organizational modes a la Ishiguro
(2010a) into a simplied skill-biased technological change model a la Acemoglu (2002b) to provide a
unied explanation for the recent trend in organizational changes and wage inequalities.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model. Section 3 characterizes equilibrium
and illustrates the possibilities of multiple equilibria. Section 4 explains how organizational changes
interact with the skill premium and residual wage inequality, and Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
The economy is populated by two types of individuals: a mass H of skilled and a mass L of unskilled
individuals. The total population size of the economy isN and is expressed asN = H+L = hN+(1 h)N ,
where h is the skilled ratio in the population. An unskilled individual can be employed only for producing
nal goods. A skilled individual works as a skilled worker in the nal goods sector or as a manager in
the intermediate goods sector.
There is one nal good produced by competitive rms with access to two types of production tech-
nologies. One of these technologies, which we call the \old technology," combines skilled labor with
unskilled labor, and the other technology, which we call the \new technology," combines skilled labor
with an expanding variety of intermediate goods. Final goods are used for consumption and for manu-
facturing intermediate goods. The intermediate goods sector consists of rms that produce horizontally
5Nikolowa (2010) introduces a moral hazard problem into a knowledge-based hierarchy model that was developed by
Garicano (2003). Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), which extend Garicano (2003), argue that the reduction in the
costs of acquiring and communicating information leads to the decline in the rm size and the rise in wage inequality in the
U.S.. Following Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), we also focus on the relationship between organizational change and
wage inequality, but we explicitly consider a moral hazard problem and focus on organizational changes in the allocation
of decision-making authority inside a rm rather than the formation of knowledge based hierarchies.
6Ishiguro (2010b) incorporates a moral hazard problem into an overlapping generations model to examine the interactions
between organizational choice and economic development. The author shows that there are multiple equilibrium paths.
Some paths converge to the steady-state with the decentralized organization, while other paths converge to the steady-
state with the centralized organization. Marin and Verdier (2008, 2009) combine the Aghion and Tirole (1997) model of
rm organizations with the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) monopolistic competition model to describe the interaction between
organizational modes and market competition in general equilibrium.
4
dierentiated goods under monopolistic competition with free entry. Each owner of a rm in the inter-
mediate goods sector matches a skilled individual for production. Then, the owner chooses the rm's
organizational modes, which depend on whether the owner delegates decision-making authority to the
matched skilled individuals or retains it for herself.7 When the matched skilled individual is delegated
authority, he can choose whether to accept such an oer and whether to work or shirk if he accepts it.
This situation involves a moral hazard problem. If the matched skilled individual accepts the oer, he
works as a manager in the rm; if he rejects the oer, he works as a skilled worker in the nal goods
sector. Our paper denes the \skill premium" as the wage dierence between the average wage of the
skilled individuals (i.e., managers and skilled workers) and the wage of unskilled workers. We dene
\within-group wage inequality" as the wage dierence among skilled individuals (i.e., between managers
and skilled workers).
2.1 Final Goods Sector
Final goods are produced by perfectly competitive rms that can exploit the two types of production
technologies. In the new technology, rms combine skilled labor HN with an expanding variety of
intermediate goods xj , j 2 [0; A] as follows:
YN = H
1 
N
Z A
0
xj dj; 0 <  < 1: (1)
In the old technology, rms combine skilled labor HO with unskilled labor LO according to the CES
production function as follows
YO = B[H

O + (1  )LO]
1
 ;   1
2
; (2)
where B is a technology parameter of the old technology.8 Because skilled workers are mobile between
the old and new technology rms, the wage of skilled workers is equalized across these rms.
Let pj , wL, and wH denote the price of intermediate goods j, the wage of unskilled workers (hence-
forth, the unskilled wage), and the wage of skilled workers (henceforth, the skilled wage), respectively.
Prot maximization in the competitive nal goods sector is consistent with the following conditions in
factor markets:
pj = H
1 
N x
 1
j ; (3)
7We use the feminine pronoun for owners and the masculine pronoun for skilled individuals, including managers.
8To avoid unnecessary lexicographic explanation, we focus our analysis on the case where   1
2
. Skilled and unskilled
workers are gross substitutes (resp. complements) when  > 0 (resp.  < 0). Thus, the assumption  < 1
2
holds true for
the Leontif case ( !  1) and the Cobb-Douglas case ( ! 0) but does not satisfy the case where skilled and unskilled
workers are perfect substitutes (! 1).
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wL = (1  )B[( HO
(1  h)N )
 + (1  )] 1  ; (4)
wH = (1  )H N
Z A
0
xj dj (5)
= B[ + (1  )( HO
(1  h)N )
 ]
1 
 : (6)
Note that (5) and (6) represent the skilled wage in the new technology and the old technology, respectively.
Because unskilled individuals can only be employed to produce the nal good, LO = L = (1 h)N holds.
2.2 Intermediate Goods Sector
The intermediate goods sector consists of A horizontally dierentiated goods produced under monop-
olistic competition with free entry a la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). There are A rms, each of which
has a simple hierarchy consisting of a rm owner and a manager. In each rm, the owner hires one
skilled individual as the manager to start up her rm. We assume that the owner cannot exploit the
intermediate goods production technology by herself and that she is therefore required to employ one
skilled individual as the manager. For clarity, we continue our discussion with the assumption that the
owner has already succeeded in employing one manager.9 One unit of intermediate good is produced by
zj units of the nal goods. The marginal cost of production in terms of nal goods zj depends on the
organizational mode j, which is chosen by the owner.10
Under these specications, each intermediate goods rm maximizes its gross prot
j = (pj   zj)xj = H1 N xj   zjxj : (7)
The optimal choice of xj is represented by
xj = [
2
zj
]
1
1 HN ; (8)
which implies an equilibrium price
pj =
zj

; (9)
and an equilibrium gross prot
j = HNzj
  1  = Rzj 

1  ; (10)
where   1  
2
1  and R  HN .
9We explain the matching procedure in the next subsection.
10We illustrate the available organizational modes in section 2.4.
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2.3 Matching
At the beginning of a period, each owner of the intermediate goods rm enters the matching market to
nd one skilled individual who may serve as a manager of the production site. Each skilled individual
also enters the matching market to nd an opportunity to work as a manager. However, as we will see
in Section 3, the number of rms in equilibrium is always smaller than the number of skilled individuals
(i.e., A < H = hN). Thus, the supply of manager positions is always on the short side of the matching
market. For simplicity, we suppose that a player on the short side of the market can nd a trading partner.
Applying this short-side principle in the current model, we can ensure that each owner meets one skilled
individual, while each skilled individual fails to match with an owner with a positive probability. Here,
skilled individuals are assumed to be rationed randomly.
On the one hand, a skilled individual who succeeds in matching with an owner can be a manager
of an intermediate goods production site. Alternatively, he can freely decline to work as a manager. In
that case, he would be a skilled worker in the nal goods sector and would earn the competitive labor
market skilled wage. Therefore, to exploit the intermediate goods production technologies, the owner
must oer an acceptable wage contract to her matched skilled individual. On the other hand, a skilled
individual who fails to match with an owner has no alternative other than being a skilled worker in the
nal goods sector.
2.4 Optimal Contracts and Organizational Modes
This section characterizes the optimal organizational mode of intermediate goods rms. The marginal
cost of production in terms of nal goods zj depends on the managerial action e 2 f0; 1g. Here, the
owner has two options: one is to choose the action e 2 f0; 1g by herself, and the other is to delegate the
decision-making authority for action e 2 f0; 1g to the manager. We call the former option the centralized
organizational mode (\C-mode") and the latter option the decentralized mode (\D-mode"). In the C-
mode, the owner incurs an action cost ce, where c > 0 and the marginal cost of production is expressed
as zj = z(C; e). In the D-mode, the manager incurs an action cost ge, where g > 0 and the marginal
cost of production is expressed as zj = z(D; e).
As in the study by Ishiguro (2010a), we assume that the manager is more ecient than the owner
because he can produce intermediate goods more eciently and at a lower action cost than the owner.
Assumption 1. z(C; 1) > z(D; 1) and c > g.
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This assumption is justied by the following two arguments: First, in general, the fact that the manager
can complete the task more eciently than the owner because of his informational advantage is often
emphasized as a positive aspect of delegation.11 Second, a more specic reason in our model is that the
owner generally has more tasks than the manager, such as the choices of organizational modes and the
design of wage contracts. Therefore, the productivity of the manager with respect to choosing the ecient
method of production would be higher than that of the owner because the manager can concentrate solely
on this specic task. For simplicity, we normalize z(C; 1) = ' > 1 = z(D; 1). Moreover, to focus on the
case where the owner always wants to implement e = 1, irrespective of the organizational mode, we add
the following assumption.
Assumption 2. Both z(C; 0) and z(D; 0) are prohibitively high.
This assumption means that when e = 0 is implemented, the marginal cost of production will be pro-
hibitively high, regardless of the organizational mode.
We suppose that neither the action taken by the manager nor the associated outcome is veriable and
hence contractible. However, the owner receives a contractible signal s 2 fG;Bg on which contacts can
be conditioned.12 This signal s = fG;Bg is correlated with the manager's action e 2 f0; 1g as follows:
s =
(
G with probability q(e);
B with probability 1  q(e): (11)
We suppose that 4q  q(1)   q(0) > 0. s = G (resp. s = B) represents a good (resp. bad) signal for
the manager's action. Thus, 4q > 0 implies that veriable signals s are informative; thus, an owner
compensates a manager based on the signal she received.
Here, we have the owner's problem in the D-mode and in the C-mode. First, we consider the D-mode.
The owner should minimize the expected wage for the manager, subject to a set of relevant constraints,
by specifying a compensation scheme fvG; vBg, where vG (resp. vB) is the wage when s = G (resp.
s = B). This problem is represented as follows:
min
(vG;vB)
q(1)vG + [1  q(1)]vB ;
which is subject to
11See, for example, Aghion and Tirole (1997), Dessein (2002), or Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) on the advantages and
disadvantages of delegation for the owner.
12Our setting follows MacLeod (2003).
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q(1)vG + [1  q(1)]vB   g  wH ; (IR)
q(1)vG + [1  q(1)]vB   g  q(0)vG + [1  q(0)]vB + b; (IC)
vG  0 and vB  0: (LL)
(IR) indicates the individual rationality constraint for the manager. Note that the reservation value for
the manager is supposed to be the skilled wage wH , which is determined by the labor market. (IC)
is the incentive compatibility constraint, which induces the manager to choose e = 1 instead of e = 0
under the contract fvG; vBg. As in Tirole (2005), b indicates the private benet that the manager can
obtain when he exerts no eort (i.e., e = 0); exerting eort (i.e., e = 1) yields no private benet. For
example, a private benet b could be interpreted as a manager's benet by selling useful information
on the operations of production to other owners. Finally, (LL) is the limited liability constraint that
ensures that the manager receives non-negative rewards.
The optimal solution to the above problem is given as follows:13 (a) the optimal contract is (vG; vB) =
((g+ b)=q; 0) when q(1)q (g+ b)  g > wH , where (IC) binds; (b) the optimal contract is (vG; vB), which
satises (IR) with equality when q(1)q (g + b)  g  wH .
In case (a), (IC) is binding while (IR) becomes slack. The owner must give the manager positive
information rent over his reservation value wH to induce e = 1. Therefore, the expected payo of the
manager becomes larger than his reservation value. This implies that the owner suers from the agency
cost. Recalling (10) and z(D; 1) = 1, the owner's expected payo in case (a) is given by R  q(1)q (g + b),
where R represents the gross prot under the D-mode as R  HN . In case (b), (IR) is binding while
(IC) becomes slack. In this case, the owner is not required to give the manager positive information rent
to induce e = 1. Therefore, the expected payo to the manager equals his reservation value wH . The
owner's expected payo in case (b) is given by R  (wH + g). In sum, the expected payos for the owner
and for the manager under the D-mode are as follows, respectively:
^D = R maxfq(1)
q
(g + b); wH + gg: (12)
v^D = maxfq(1)
q
(g + b)  g; wHg: (13)
13See, for example, Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (2001) for nding the optimal contracts of this problem.
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Note that the manager always chooses e = 1 under Assumption 2.
Next, under the C-mode, the owner who chooses an action oers a xed wage wH to the manager to
compensate him for his reservation value. Note that the owner needs one unit of skilled labor to start
up the project even when she does not delegate the decision-making authority. Hence, recalling (10) and
z(C; 1) = ', the owner's expected payo under the C-mode is
^C = R'
  1    (wH + c): (14)
Note that the owner always chooses e = 1 under Assumption 2.
2.5 Optimal Organizational Modes
Here, we characterize the optimal organizational modes. Notice that the optimal organizational modes
depend on the market size of intermediate goods (henceforth, the market size) and on the skilled wage.
From (8), the market size is in direct proportion to the skilled labor size in the new technology HN .
Therefore, HN could be regarded as the proxy of the market size. We nd that ^D  ^C holds if and
only if
R  HN  1
1  '  1  [
q(1)
q
(g + b)  (wH + c)]  T (wH): (15)
The optimal organizational mode can be illustrated in Figure 1. The T (wH) line represents the threshold
that determines the optimal organizational mode. In the area above (resp. below) the T (wH) line, the
owner chooses the D-mode (resp. C-mode). Figure 1 implies that the owner prefers the D-mode to the
C-mode when the market size is large or the skilled wage is high.
[Figure 1]
The intuition is as follows. The positive eect of the owner adopting the D-mode is that the manager
can produce intermediate goods more eciently than the owner. The marginal benet of this eect
becomes more critical as the market size becomes large. Hence, the owner is more likely to adopt
the D-mode when the market size is large. However, when the skilled wage is small enough to satisfy
wH <
q(1)
q (g + b)   g, where (IC) is binding under the D-mode, the delegation of the decision-making
authority provides the manager with more power to extract a higher reward q(1)q (g + d), which reects
his informational advantage over the owner. As in Ishiguro (2010a), this reward is independent of the
skilled wage. On the contrary, under the C-mode, the manager's reward increases in the skilled wage.
Hence, as the skilled wage increases, the owner is more likely to prefer the D-mode to the C-mode because
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the expected wage under the C-mode increases, and the expected wage under the D-mode is constant
at q(1)q (g + b). However, if the skilled wage is too small to exploit the positive eect of adopting the
D-mode, the owner adopts the C-mode because it is costly for her to pay an information rent to the
manager under the D-mode.
2.6 Free Entry and Equilibrium Organizational Mode
Firms enter the intermediate goods market until prots are driven down to cover the startup costs (i.e.,
the cost of employing the manager). From (12), the free-entry condition for rms under the D-mode is
given by
R = maxfF ICD ; F IRD (wH)g  FD(wH); (16)
where F ICD  q(1)q (g + b) and F IRD (wH)  wH + g. Note that the relation F ICD > F IRD (wH) holds when
wH < wH  q(1)q (g + b)   g. On the contrary, from (14), the free-entry condition for rms under the
C-mode is given by
R = '

1  (wH + c)  FC(wH): (17)
[Figure 2]
Figure 2 shows the relationships among T (wH) in (15), FD(wH) in (16) and FC(wH) in (17). The
FD(wH) line consists of two parts: the horizontal line of F
IC
D when (IC) is binding (i.e., wH > wH) and
the upward sloping line of F IRD (wH) when (IR) is binding (i.e., wH  wH), where wH is the intersection
between F ICD and F
IR
D (wH). The FC(wH) line is also upward sloping in wH , but the slope of the FC(wH)
line is larger than that of the FD(wH) line. To avoid unnecessary lexicographic explanations, we add the
following parametric assumption:
Assumption 3. q(1)q (g + b)'
  1  > c.
Under Assumption 3, the T (wH), FC(wH) and F
IC
D lines have a unique intersection at EM , where
(wH ; R) = (wH ; F
IC
D ) and wH  q(1)q (g + b)' 

1    c.14 Hence, recalling that the owner chooses the
D-mode (resp. C-mode) in the area above (resp. below) the T (wH) line, the free-entry condition in
equilibrium is summarized as
R = F (wH) 
8><>:
'

1  (wH + c)  FC(wH); if wH 2 [0; wH ];
q(1)
q (g + b)  F ICD ; if wH 2 [wH ; wH ];
wH + g  F IRD (wH); if wH 2 [wH ;1);
(18)
14Assumption 3 ensures the existence of parameter regions for which the C-mode can be a possible equilibrium organi-
zational mode.
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where wH  q(1)q (g + b)   g. Equation (18) is illustrated in Figure 2 as a bold line. This equation
implies that when the skilled wage is suciently small enough (resp. large) to satisfy wH  wH (resp.
wH  wH), only the C-mode (resp. D-mode) is a possible candidate for the equilibrium organizational
mode. In particular, under the D-mode, (IC) is binding when wH 2 [wH ; wH ], while (IR) is binding
when wH 2 [wH ;1).
2.7 Labor Market
The market clearing condition for skilled workers is
HO +HN +AC +AD = HO +HN +A = H = hN; (19)
where AC and AD represent the number of intermediate goods rms adopting the C-mode and the D-
mode, respectively, and A represents the total number of intermediate goods rms (i.e., A = AC +AD).
For clarity of exposition, we denote the share of the intermediate goods rms that adopt the D-mode
(henceforth, the share of the D-mode) as k 2 [0; 1]. Hence, AC = (1  k)A and AD = kA, respectively.
Recall that from (5), the skilled wage in the new technology rms is (1 )H N
R A
0
xj dj. Substituting
xj in (8), we get
wH = w[AD + '
  1 AC ] = w[k + (1  k)'  1  ]A; (20)
where w = (1 ) 21  . Note that the skilled wage depends on the share of the D-mode k 2 [0; 1] and on
the amount of the variety of intermediate goods A. Because the marginal cost of producing intermediate
goods under the D-mode is lower than it is under the C-mode, the price of intermediate goods under
the D-mode is relatively lower. Hence, from (5) and (8), as the share of the D-mode increases given the
amount of the variety of intermediate goods A, the amount of each intermediate goods input xj that
contributes to the production of the nal goods increases. This enhances the marginal productivity of
skilled workers in the nal goods sector and raises the skilled wage. From (5) and (8), as the amount
of the variety of intermediate goods A increases given the amount of each intermediate goods input, the
marginal productivity of skilled workers increases, which raises the skilled wage.
In equilibrium, the skilled wage is equalized across the old and new technology rms. Hence, from
(5), (6) and (20), we have
wH = w[k + (1  k)'  1  ]A = B[ + (1  )( HO
(1  h)N )
 ]
1 
 : (21)
Equation (21) implies that skilled workers are driven out of the old technology rms by the higher skilled
wage (i.e., @HO@wH < 0).
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3 Equilibrium
This section characterizes the general equilibrium of our model. In the following analysis, we label the
equilibrium in which all owners choose the D-mode (i.e., k = 1) the \D-mode equilibrium," and we
label the equilibrium in which all owners choose the C-mode (i.e., k = 0) the \C-mode equilibrium."
We also label the equilibrium in which owners are indierent about whether to choose the C-mode or
the D-mode (i.e., k 2 (0; 1)) the \mixed equilibrium."
Recall from (10) that the gross prot under the D-mode R  HN is in direct proportion to the
skilled worker size in the new technology rms HN . Using the skilled labor market clearing condition
of (19), we have R = (hN   HO   A). From (6), we obtain HO(wH ;h) = (1   h)N [ (
wH
B )

1  
1  ]
  1 .
We also have A(wH ; k) =
wH
w[k+(1 k)'
 
1  ]
from (20). Hence, substituting HO(wH ;h) and A(wH ; k) into
R = (hN  HO  A), we have
R = [hN  HO(wH ;h) A(wH ; k)]  G(wH ; k;h): (22)
In Appendix A, we show that there is a unique threshold for the skilled wage ~wH such that
@G(wH ; k;h)
@wH
8><>:
> 0 if wH > ~wH ;
= 0 if wH = ~wH ;
< 0 if wH < ~wH :
(23)
As we described in Figures 3, 4, and 5, the G(wH ; k;h) line is depicted as an inverted-U shaped function
of wH . Moreover, because
@A(wH ;k)
@k < 0, we have
@G(wH ; k;h)
@k
> 0: (24)
Thus, G(wH ; 1;h) > G(wH ; 0;h) holds. This implies that the G(wH ; k;h) line under the D-mode always
lies above the G(wH ; k;h) line under the C-mode. In addition, the G(wH ; k;h) line for any k 2 (0; 1) is
located in the regions between G(wH ; 0;h) and G(wH ; 1;h). Furthermore, because
@HO(wH ;h)
@h < 0, we
have
@G(wH ; k;h)
@h
> 0: (25)
Hence, the G(wH ; k;h) line shifts upward as the skilled ratio in the population h increases.
Figures 3, 4, and 5 depict both the G(wH ; 1;h) and G(wH ; 0;h) lines according to the value of h.
Supposing hC < hM < hD, Figures 3, 4, and 5 represent three typical cases where h is low (i.e., h = hC),
high (i.e., h = hD), and medium (i.e., h = hM ), respectively. The intersection of G(wH ; k;h) in (22) and
the free-entry condition F (wH) in (18) will determine the equilibrium. However, G(wH ; k;h) and F (wH)
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generally have two intersections. As discussed in Appendix B, an equilibrium is stable only when the
slope of F (wH) is not smaller than that of G(wH ; k;h) (i.e.,
@G(wH ;k;h)
@wH
 @F (wH)@wH ). For example, with
regard to the relationship between F (wH) and G(wH ; 0;h), the intersection to the left of EC is unstable
even if it exists. Therefore, we focus on EC (resp. ED) in the case of k = 0 (resp. k = 1). Because the
owner chooses the D-mode (resp. C-mode) in the area above (resp. below) the T (wH), ED (resp. EC)
can be an equilibrium only when ED (resp. EC) is in the area above (resp. below) the T (wH).
3.1 The C-mode and D-mode equilibria
First, let us consider the case of Figure 3, where the skilled ratio h is suciently low (i.e., h = hC).
G(wH ; 1;hC) does not have any intersections with F (wH) in the area above T (wH). Hence, the D-mode
equilibrium is never realized. On the contrary, G(wH ; 0;hC) intersects with F (wH) at EC in the area
below T (wH). Hence, the C-mode equilibrium could be a possible outcome.
15 The mixed equilibrium is
realized only when each owner is indierent about whether to choose the C-mode or the D-mode (i.e.,
the points on the T (wH) line) and the free-entry condition F (wH) are satised. Therefore, the mixed
equilibrium is realized only when there is an interior value of k 2 (0; 1) such that G(wH ; k;hC) passes
through the point EM where T (wH) and F (wH) have a unique intersection. However, for any interior
k 2 (0; 1), G(wH ; k;hC) is located in the region between G(wH ; 0;hC) and G(wH ; 1;hC) and cannot pass
through the point EM . Hence, the mixed equilibrium (i:e:; k
 2 (0; 1)) is never realized. Therefore, when
the skilled ratio h is suciently low, the unique C-mode equilibrium is realized at EC in Figure 3.
[Figure 3]
Next, let us consider the case in Figure 4 where the skilled ratio h is suciently high (i.e., h = hD)
such that G(wH ; 0;hD) cannot intersect with F (wH) in the area below T (wH). Although the C-mode
equilibrium is never realized, the D-mode equilibrium is a possible outcome, as G(wH ; 1;hD) intersects
with F (wH) at ED in the area above T (wH).
16 As with the logic in Figure 3, the mixed equilibrium is
never realized. As a result, when the skilled ratio h is suciently high, the unique D-mode equilibrium
is realized at ED in Figure 4.
[Figure 4]
15Appendix C briey discusses the parameter conditions under which the C-mode equilibrium exists.
16Appendix C briey discusses the parameter conditions under which the D-mode equilibrium exists.
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3.2 Multiple Equilibria and Their Selection
When the skilled ratio h has an intermediate value (i.e., h = hM ), the mixed equilibrium and the D-
mode and C-mode equilibria will arise. As described in Figure 5, G(wH ; 0;hM ) intersects with F (wH)
at EC in the area below T (wH). Hence, the C-mode equilibrium is a possible outcome. On the contrary,
G(wH ; 1;hM ) intersects with F (wH) at ED in the area above T (wH). Hence, the D-mode equilibrium is
also a possible outcome. Moreover, because G(wH ; k;hM ), for any k 2 (0; 1) that is located in the regions
between G(wH ; 0;hM ) and G(wH ; 1;hM ), there is always a unique k
 2 (0; 1) such that G(wH ; k;hM )
passes through the point EM .
17 Hence, a mixed equilibrium is also a possible outcome. As a result,
when the skilled ratio h is intermediate, there are the following three rational expectation equilibria: (1)
the C-mode equilibrium at EC , (2) the D-mode equilibrium at ED, and (3) the mixed equilibrium at
EM .
[Figure 5]
The mechanism behind multiple equilibria can be explained as follows:18 As discussed in Section
2.4, each owner prefers the D-mode to the C-mode when the market size is large or the skilled wage
is high. The market size is determined by the skilled labor size in the new technology rms (i.e.,
HN = hN HO(wH) A), and the skilled wage is determined by (21) (i.e., wH = w[k+(1 k)'  1  ]A).
Given the amount of the variety of intermediate goods A, (21) shows that the skilled wage increases when
the share of the D-mode increases. The increase of wH induces the reallocation of skilled workers from
the old to the new technology rms because @HO@wH < 0 and
@HN
@wH
> 0. This leads to an increase in the
skilled labor size in new technology rms, which represents the market size. This process produces the
following feedback eect. The increase in the share of the D-mode creates an environment in which each
owner is more likely to choose the D-mode. This feedback eect leads to multiple equilibria.
Which equilibrium is realized among EC , ED, and EM depends on each owner's expectation about
the equilibrium. First, suppose that each rm owner expects that the D-mode equilibrium will occur
(i.e., each owner expects that other owners will choose the D-mode). In this case, the skilled wage
will become suciently high and the market size will become suciently large, which in turn will make
17Note that the point EM satises (wH ; R) = (wH ; F
IC
D ). Hence, by substituting (wH ; R) = (wH ; F
IC
D ) into (22), we
obtain the unique interior k 2 (0; 1) that satises G(wH ; k;hM ) = F ICD .
18Although the mechanism behind multiple equilibria is analogous to that explained by Ishiguro (2010b), this paper
diers from it with respect to how the higher share of the D-mode leads to the larger market size of intermediate goods. In
the paper by Ishiguro (2010b), the increase in the share of the D-mode increases the wage of young workers and enhances
their capital accumulation, which expands the market size of intermediate goods. On the contrary, in this paper, the
increase in the share of the D-mode increases the skilled wage and induces the reallocation of skilled workers from the old
to the new technology rms, which expands the market size of intermediate goods.
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choosing the D-mode more attractive for each owner. The above feedback eect will occur, and the
D-mode equilibrium will be realized as a self-fullling equilibrium. Second, suppose that each owner
expects that the C-mode equilibrium will occur. In this case, the C-mode equilibrium will become a
self-fullling equilibrium in a similar way but through an inverse feedback eect. Finally, suppose that
each owner expects that a mixed equilibrium will occur such that each owner will expect that a fraction
k 2 (0; 1) of rms will choose the D-mode, where k satises G(wH ; k;hM ) = F ICD . In this case, the
skilled wage and the market size will be adjusted to ensure that the relation ^D = ^C holds. Thus, each
owner will be indierent about whether to choose the D-mode or the C-mode, and the mixed equilibrium
will be realized as a self-fullling equilibrium. In sum, the equilibrium organizational mode in Figure 5
depends on how each owner forms her expectation about the intentions of other owners.
We can provide an informal argument of the stability properties of the equilibria we derived above.
Suppose that the economy is in the mixed equilibrium at EM in Figure 5, and assume that the skilled
wage wH has decreased (resp. increased) slightly from wH for exogenous reasons. In this case, as is easily
conrmed from (15) and Figure 5, the relation R < T (wH) (resp. R > T (wH)) holds, and all rm owners
have strict incentives to choose the C-mode (resp. D-mode). Hence, the economy instantly deviates from
the mixed equilibrium at EM to reach the C-mode equilibrium at EC (resp. D-mode equilibrium at ED).
Therefore, the mixed equilibrium we obtained in Figure 5 is unstable in the sense that the economy
cannot be returned to the original equilibrium once it deviates from it. On the contrary, both the C-
mode equilibrium at EC and the D-mode equilibrium at ED are stable. In the following analysis, we
focus our analysis on these two stable equilibria.
3.3 Results and Evidence
Our results imply that a rm's organizational form changes from centralized to decentralized as the skilled
ratio in the population increases and the skilled wage correspondingly increases. Some empirical studies
provide evidence that organizational changes are complementary to skilled labor and that a larger supply
of skilled labor is associated with more decentralized decision-making in rms (Caroli and Reenen, 2001;
Bresnahan et al., 2002; Bauer and Bender, 2004). In general, the skilled ratio in developed countries is
higher than the ratio in developing countries. Additionally, decentralization seems to be more ubiquitous
in developed countries than it is in developing countries. Bloom et al. (2009) nd that the delegation of
decision-making from a rm owner to her manager is positively associated with how developed a country
is. Our theoretical result is partly consistent with this nding.
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In the intermediate range of the skilled labor ratio, note that there are multiple equilibria from
which rms' degree of decentralization could dier, even among countries with similar skilled labor
ratios and technological conditions. Bloom et al. (2009) also nd that there are signicant dierences in
the decentralization of rms, even in developed economies with similar skilled ratios and technological
conditions. Bloom et al. (2009) emphasize that cultural factors, such as religion and regional trust, play
crucial roles in accounting for cross-regional dierences in rms' organizational modes. These cultural
factors play substantial roles in coordinating expectations. These results suggest that our nding of
multiple equilibria could provide a possible explanation for the empirical ndings.
4 Skill Premium and Within-group Inequality
This section focuses on labor market outcomes. In particular, we are interested in how \within-group
inequality" and the \skill premium" respond to organizational changes that are caused by changes in
the skilled ratio in the population. Our paper denes the skill premium as the wage dierence between
the average wage of skilled individuals (i.e., the average wage of managers and skilled workers) and the
wage of unskilled workers. Additionally, we dene within-group inequality as the wage dierence between
managers and skilled workers (i.e., within skilled group inequality).
4.1 Skill Premium
In this subsection, we rst dene the skill premium in our model. We describe the relationship between
the skilled ratio h and the skilled wage wH on the right side of Figure 6, and we dene the relationship
between the skilled wage wH and the unskilled wage wL on the left side of Figure 6.
[Figure 6]
On the right side of Figure 6, the k = 0 line (resp. k = 1 line) shows the relationship between h
and wH in the C-mode equilibrium (resp. the D-mode equilibrium), while the k
 2 (0; 1) line shows the
relationship in the mixed equilibrium. At suciently low (resp. high) values of h, the unique C-mode
equilibrium (resp. D-mode equilibrium) is realized as shown in Figure 3 (resp. Figure 4). However,
at an intermediate range of values of h 2 [h; h], there are three possible outcomes: (1) the C-mode
equilibrium, (2) the D-mode equilibrium, and (3) the mixed equilibrium. Three vertical lines show the
cases where the skilled ratio is suciently low (i.e., h = hC), suciently high (i.e., h = hD), and medium
(i.e., h = hM ), respectively. In what follows, we assume that the mixed equilibrium never occurs for the
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stability reasons that were discussed above.19
Note that the skilled wage increases as the skilled ratio in the population increases from hC to hD.
With h = hC (resp. h = hD), the skilled wage is uniquely given by w
1
H (resp. w
4
H) at E1 (resp. E4).
However, with h = hM , there are two possible equilibria for the skilled wage: w
2
H at E2 and w
3
H at
E3. Which skilled wage is realized depends on each owner's expectation about the equilibrium. We can
easily conrm that the relation w1H < w
2
H < w
3
H < w
4
H holds from Figure 6. In particular, when the
organizational mode shifts from the C-mode to the D-mode in the range of h 2 [h; h], there is a jump of
skilled wages. For example, suppose that an organizational mode change occurs at h = hM , the skilled
wage increases from w2H to w
3
H . Here, we implicitly assume that an organizational mode decision is
irreversible, and thus, an organizational change occurs only once.
The left side of Figure 6 shows the negative relationship between the skilled and unskilled wages,
which is derived by eliminating HO=(1   h)N from (4) and (6). With h = hC (resp. h = hD), the
unskilled wage wL is uniquely given by w
1
L (resp. w
4
L) at E1 (resp. E4). However, with h = hM , there
are two possible equilibria for the unskilled wages: w2L at E2 and w
3
L at E3. It is straightforward that
the relation w1L > w
2
L > w
3
L > w
4
L holds from Figure 6. Therefore, the increase in the skilled wage wH
that is caused by the increase in the skilled ratio draws the skilled labor out of the old technology rms
(i.e., @HO@wH < 0) and decreases the unskilled wage given by (4).
The skill premium is calculated as the ratio of the average of the manager's wage and the skilled
wage to the unskilled wage. Thus, under the D-mode at E3 or E4, the skill premium is provided as
A
hN max[wH + g;
q(1)
4q (g + b)] + (1  AhN )wH
wL
; (26)
where AhN 2 (0; 1) represents the share of the manager's wage among skilled individuals (henceforth, the
share of the manager). Note that under the C-mode equilibrium at E1 or E2, the manager's wage equals
the skilled wage. Hence, the skill premium is wHwL .
4.2 Organizational Changes and the Skill Premium
In this subsection, we examine how the skill premium responds to organizational changes that are caused
by changes in the skilled ratio in the population. We rst focus on the case where the skilled ratio
increases from hC to hM . As h increases, the equilibrium also changes from E1 to E2 or E3. From
Figure 6, we conrm that the relation
w1H
w1L
<
w2H
w2L
holds. Hence, the skill premium at E2 is larger than
19This assumption simplies the following explanation. Explicit consideration of the mixed equilibrium does not alter
our main arguments, but it requires unnecessary lexicographic explanations.
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the skill premium at E1. Note that both E1 and E2 exhibit the C-mode equilibrium (i.e., k
 = 0). In
addition, the skill premium at E3 (i.e., the D-mode equilibrium) is given by
A3
hMN
max[w3H + g;
q(1)
4q (g + b)] + (1  A3hMN )w3H
w3L
; (27)
where A3hMN 2 (0; 1) represents the share of the manager at E3. Because max[w3H + g;
q(1)
4q g] > w
3
H > w
2
H
and w3L < w
2
L,
A3
hMN
max[w3H + g;
q(1)
4q (g + b)] + (1  A3hMN )w3H
w3L
>
w2H
w2L
holds. Hence, the skill premium at E3 is larger than the skill premium at E2. These results indicate that
when the skilled ratio increases from hL to hM , the skill premium increases regardless of organizational
changes. However, the increase in the skill premium becomes larger with organizational changes.
Next, we focus on increasing from hM to hH , and we compare the skill premiums at E2, E3, and E4.
As discussed above, the skill premium at E3 is larger than the skill premium at E2. In addition, the skill
premium at E4 (i.e., the D-mode equilibrium) is provided by
A4
hHN
max[w4H + g;
q(1)
4q (g + b)] + (1  A4hHN )w4H
w4L
; (28)
where A4hHN 2 (0; 1) represents the share of the manager at E4. Analogous to the comparison of E2 and
E3, because max[w
4
H + g;
q(1)
4q g] > w
4
H > w
2
H and w
4
L < w
2
L, the skill premium at E4 is larger than the
skill premium at E2. With regard to the comparison between E3 and E4, there are three possible cases:
(1) both E3 and E4 lie in the region where (IC) is binding (i.e., w
3
H < w
4
H  wH), (2) E3 lies in the
region where (IC) is binding, while E4 lies in the region where (IR) is binding (i.e., w
3
H < wH < w
4
H),
and (3) both E3 and E4 lie in the region where (IR) is binding (i.e., wH  w3H < w4H).20 Because we
have w4H > w
3
H and w
4
L < w
3
L,
A4
hHN
 A3hMN is the sucient condition for the skill premium at E4 to be
larger than the skill premium at E3. This inequality means that the share of the manager at E4 is not
smaller than his share at E3.
We can show that the sucient condition A4hHN  A3hMN holds when both E3 and E4 lie in the regions
where (IC) is binding (i.e., w3H < w
4
H  wH). From Figure 5, when (IC) is binding, R  HN = F ICD
holds in the D-mode equilibrium. This implies that the skilled labor size in new technology rms
remains constant at HN =
1
F
IC
D . Therefore, supposing that both E3 and E4 lie in the regions where
(IC) is binding, even when the skilled ratio h increases from hM to hH , the skilled labor size of the new
technology rms HN will remain constant at HN =
1
F
IC
D . On the contrary, the skilled labor size in the
20Figure 6 displays the case of (2), where the relation w3H < wH < w
4
H holds.
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old technology rms HO decreases because HO(w
4
H) < HO(w
3
H) holds. Therefore, recalling the labor
market clearing condition (i.e., A = hN  HO  HN ), A4hHN  A3hMN is satised. Supposing that both E3
and E4 lie in the regions where (IC) is binding (i.e., w
3
H < w
4
H  wH), the skill premium at E4 becomes
larger than it was at E3.
In the other two possible cases (i.e., w3H < wH < w
4
H and wH  w3H < w4H), we cannot show that
A4
hHN
 A3hMN holds analytically true while A4 > A3 holds.21 The skill premium at E4 may become
smaller than the skill premium at E3 when the share of the manager at E4 (i.e.,
A4
hHN
) becomes too small
relative to E3 (i.e.,
A3
hMN
), which osets the impacts of the increase in the skill premium in the nal
goods sector (i.e., w4H > w
3
H and w
4
L < w
3
L). However, our numerical exercises suggest that this case
rarely occurs under plausible sets of parameter values.
These results indicate that when the economy initially lies in equilibrium E2, the increase in the
skilled ratio from hM to hH induces an organizational change and increases the skill premium, as the
skill premium at E4 is larger than the skill premium at E2. Moreover, even when the economy initially lies
in the equilibrium E3 and an organizational change has already occurred, the increase in the skilled ratio
from hM to hH raises the skill premium further under a relatively wider and plausible set of parameter
values. In sum, the increase in the skilled ratio induces the skill-biased technological change and raises
the skill premium. A corresponding enhancement of the delegation of authority in rms complements
the appreciation of the skill premium. Carolli and Van Reenen (2001) show that although organizational
changes and technological changes are complementary to the supply of skilled labor, organizational
changes have a positive eect that is independent of the eect of technological change on the demand
for skilled labor. Moreover, Gorlich and Snower (2010) show that the recent organizational changes raise
the skill premium.22 Our theoretical results are partly consistent with these empirical ndings.
4.3 Within-group Inequality
In this subsection, we examine how within-group inequality responds to organizational changes that are
caused by changes in the skilled ratio in the population. Empirical studies of wage inequality in the U.S.
have argued that within-group inequality is a major component of the increased dispersion in overall wage
inequality (Autor et al., 2008). These studies have documented that the rise in within-group inequality
21From (21), in the case of the D-mode equilibrium, the amount of the variety of intermediate goods A is expressed as a
function of wH ; A =
wH
w
. Therefore, because w4H > w
3
H in Figure 6, we nd that A4 > A3. However, we cannot generally
conrm that A4
hHN
 A3
hMN
holds because hH > hM .
22Gorlich and Snower (2010) focus on the changes in workers' spans of competence, which are dened in terms of the
breadth of their portfolios of tasks.
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appears to be largely above the median of the residual wage distribution (i.e., in the upper tail of the
distribution, which mainly includes college-educated workers). In our model, the heterogeneity among
the skilled individuals arises on account of the two occupations that are available to them: skilled workers
in the nal goods sector and managers in the intermediate goods sector. An organizational change in
rms at the intermediate goods sector triggers the dispersion of wages among skilled individuals.
Let us rst examine within-group inequality at E1, E2, E3 and E4. Under the C-mode equilibrium at
E1 and E2, the manager's wage equals the skilled wage wH . Therefore, within-group inequality does not
appear at E1 and E2. However, under the D-mode equilibrium at E3 and E4, within-group inequality
does appear. When (IC) is binding, the manager's wage q(1)4q (g+b) is higher than the skilled wage wH , as
the manager has an informational advantage over the owner. When (IR) is binding, the manager's wage
wH + g is also higher than the skilled wage because the owner needs to compensate for the manager's
action cost g. As a result, within-group inequality arises at E3 and E4.
These results indicate that the increment in the skilled ratio from hL to hM increases the within-group
inequality if it induces an organizational change. This can be conrmed by the fact that within-group
inequality appears at E3, but it does not appear at E1 and E2. In addition, supposing that the economy
initially lies in the equilibrium at E2, the increase in the skilled ratio from hM to hH will induce an
organizational change and will increase the within-group inequality. We can also conrm this from the
fact that within-group inequality appears at E4, but it does not appear at E2.
Next, we consider the case where the economy initially lies in equilibrium E3 and the skilled ratio
increases from hM to hH . In this case, if both E3 and E4 lie in the regions where (IR) is binding (i.e.,
wH  w3H < w4H), the within-group inequality remains constant because wage dierentials at E3 and
E4 are simply given by g. However, if E3 lies in regions where (IC) is binding and E4 lies in regions
where (IR) is binding (i.e., w3H < wH < w
4
H), the within-group inequality declines slightly as the wage
dierentials at E3 (i.e.,
q(1)
q g   w3H) are larger than they are at E4 (i.e., g). This discrepancy results
from w3H < wH  q(1)q g g. Supposing that both E3 and E4 lie in the regions where (IC) is binding (i.e.,
w3H < w
4
H  wH), the within-group inequality will also decline slightly because the wage dierentials at
E3 (i.e.,
q(1)
q g   w3H) are larger than they are at E4 (i.e., q(1)q g   w4H). This discrepancy results from
w3H < w
4
H .
[Figure 7]
Figure 7 depicts a typical example of the relationship between the skilled ratio and within-group in-
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equality. At a suciently low value of h, only the C-mode equilibrium is realized; therefore, within-group
inequality does not exist. However, at the intermediate range of values of h 2 [h; h], an organizational
change occurs and the D-mode equilibrium is realized. Figure 7 shows the case where the organizational
change occurs at h0 2 [h; h], and the skilled wage at h0 lies in the regions where (IC) is binding (i.e.,
wh=h
0
H < wH). In this case, within-group inequality at h = h
0 is represented by q(1)q (g + b)   wh=h
0
H .
However, the skilled wage increases as the skilled ratio increases, and therefore, within-group inequality
q(1)
q (g+ b) wH declines slightly. Supposing that the skilled wage reaches the value of wH , the economy
will enter the regions where (IR) is binding (i.e., wH  wH). Therefore, the within-group inequality will
have a constant value of g.
These results indicate that the increase in the skilled ratio enhances the delegation of authority in
rms, which increases within-group inequality. Further, the increase in the skilled labor ratio enables rm
owners to reduce the rent for the delegated manager, which negatively aects within-group inequality.
However, within-group inequality does not vanish, as it is necessary to induce managerial eort from the
delegated manager.23
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we developed a simple general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition with moral
hazard contracting to examine the interactions among skill-biased technological change, equilibrium
organizational modes and wage inequality. Analyzing this model, We demonstrate that the increase in
the relative supply of skilled labor leads to a skill-biased technological change that is represented by
an increase in the variety of intermediate goods. This improves the productivity of skilled labor and
leads to an organizational change from a centralized mode, in which an owner maintains the authority,
to a decentralized mode, in which an owner delegates the authority to a manager. This organizational
change results in the widening of within-group skilled labor wage inequality, and it increases skilled
and unskilled labor wage inequality. Moreover, we show that there are multiple equilibria where the
centralized and decentralized modes simultaneously emerge at the intermediate values of the relative
skilled labor supply. The fact that there are multiple equilibria implies that the proportion of rms that
adopt the decentralized mode can dier even among countries that have similar skilled labor ratios and
technological conditions. Our results could provide an explanation for the recent empirical ndings on
23As an empirical study, Gorlich and Snower (2010) nd that recent organizational changes lead to a skill premium and
within-group inequality.
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the interactions among skill-biased technological change, organizational changes, and wage inequality.
Appendix A
By dierentiating (22) with respect to wH , we nd
@G(wH ; k;h)
@wH
= f(1  h)N [
(wHB )

1    
1   ]
  1 1
(wHB )
2 1
1 
(1  )(1  )B  
1
w[k + (1  k)'  1  ]g:
Supposing  < 12 , limwH!0
@G(wH ;k;h)
@wH
= 1, limwH!1 @G(wH ;k;h)@wH < 0 and @@wH (
@G(wH ;k;h)
@wH
) < 0 hold.
There will be unique ~wH values that can satisfy (23).
Appendix B
This section analyzes the stability of equilibria. We mainly discuss the properties of the D-mode equi-
librium. An analogous discussion could be applied to the properties of the C-mode equilibrium.
From (6), we obtain HO(wH) = (1   h)N [ (
wH
B )

1  
1  ]
  1 . We also obtain wH(A) = w[k + (1  
k)' 

1  ]A from (20). Substituting wH(A) intoHO(wH), we obtainHO(wH(A)) = (1 h)N [ (
wH (A)
B )

1  
1  ]
  1 .
Further, by substituting (22), wH(A), and HO(wH(A)) into (12), we can express the owner's expected
payo under the D-mode ^D as a function of A as follows:
^D(wH(A); A) = R(wH(A); A) maxfq(1)
q
(g + b); wH(A) + gg;
where R(wH(A); A)  [hN HO(wH(A)) A]. Note that the number of rms A at a stable equilibrium
must satisfy the following property: d^D(wH(A
);A)
dA  0. An intuitive explanation of this property is as
follows. Suppose that the economy is in equilibrium with A, which satises d^D(wH(A
);A)
dA > 0, and
assume that the number of rms that enter the intermediate goods market has increased (resp. decreased)
slightly from A to A+ (resp. A ) for exogenous reasons. In this case, because d^D(wH(A);A)dA > 0,
the relation ^D(wH(A
 + ); A + ) > 0 (resp. ^D(wH(A   ); A   ) < 0) must hold, and more rms
have incentives to enter (resp. exit from) the intermediate goods market. Hence, the number of rms
increases (resp. decreases) from A, and the equilibrium with A that satises d^D(wH(A
);A)
dA > 0 is
unstable, as the economy cannot be returned to the original equilibrium once it deviates for exogenous
reasons.
By dierentiating ^D(wH(A); A) with A, we obtain
d^D(wH(A); A)
dA
=
(
[ @R@wH   1]@wH@A + @R@A if wH 
q(1)
q (g + b)  g;
@R
@wH
@wH
@A +
@R
@A if wH <
q(1)
q (g + b)  g;
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d^D(wH(A); A)
dA
=
(
[  @HO@wH   1]wHA    if wH 
q(1)
q (g + b)  g;
  @HO@wH wHA    if wH <
q(1)
q (g + b)  g:
A simple calculation leads to the following conditions, which are satised at the stable equilibrium:
@^D(wH(A); A)
@A
 0
(
( @HO@wH   AwH ) < 1 if wH 
q(1)
q (g + b)  g;
( @HO@wH   AwH ) < 0 if wH <
q(1)
q (g + b)  g:
On the contrary, from (16) and (22), the conditions that the slope of the FD(wH) line is not smaller
than that of the G(wH ; k;h) line are expressed as follows:
@G
@wH
 @FD
@wH

8<:( 
@HO
@wH
  1
w[k+(1 k)' 

1  ]
)  1 if wH  q(1)q (g + b)  g;
( @HO@wH   1w[k+(1 k)'  1  ] )  0 if wH <
q(1)
q (g + b)  g;
@G
@wH
 @FD
@wH

(
( @HO@wH   AwH )  1 if wH 
q(1)
q (g + b)  g;
( @HO@wH   AwH )  0 if wH <
q(1)
q (g + b)  g:
Hence, the D-mode equilibrium is stable when the slope of the FD(wH) line is not smaller than the slope
of the G(wH ; k;h) line (i.e.,
@G
@wH
 @FD@wH ).
Appendix C
This section examines the parameter conditions for which the both of the D-mode and the C-mode
equilibria exist.
First, we consider the necessary parameter conditions for which the stable D-mode equilibrium exists
when h = 1. From Figures 3 to 5, the D-mode equilibrium is more likely to emerge when the skilled ratio
h is high. Here, we consider the case where h = 1 in order to obtain necessary parameter conditions.
When h = 1, because HO(wH ; 1) = 0, the gross prot under the D-mode of (22) is represented as
R = [N  A(wH ; k)]  G(wH ; k; 1):
Because the G(wH ; k; 1) line is downward sloping in wH , G(wH ; k; 1) and the free-entry condition of
F (wH) in (18) have a unique intersection. Hence, noting k = 1, the equilibrium for skilled wages when
(IC) is binding under the D-mode satises the following equality [hN   wHw ] = q(1)q (g + b) or
wH = w[N   q(1)
q
(g + b)
1

]:
On the contrary, from (18), the D-mode equilibrium is realized when q(1)q (g + b)'
  1    c  wH .
Therefore, supposing that the condition
q(1)
q
(g + b)' 

1    c < w[N   q(1)
q
(g + b)
1

] (29)
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holds, the stable D-mode equilibrium will exist when h = 1. Note that the suciently large value of the
population size N ensures the above inequality.
Next, we examine the parameter conditions for which the stable C-mode equilibrium exists. For clarity
of explanation, we consider the Cobb-Douglas production function (i.e.,  ! 0) in the old technology:
YO = BH

OL
1 
O . From Appendix B, supposing that the condition
@G
@wH
 @FC
@wH
 ( @HO
@wH
  1
w[k + (1  k)'  1  ] )  '

1 
holds, the C-mode equilibrium will be stable. Because k = 0 under the C-mode and HO(wH ;h) =
(1  h)N(B) 11 w 
1
1 
H under the Cobb-Douglas specication, this stability condition is represented as
[
(B)
1
1  (1  h)N
(1 + )(1  )' 1  ]
1 
2   wH :
On the contrary, from (18), the C-mode equilibrium is realized when q(1)q (g + b)'
  1    c  wH .
Therefore, supposing that the condition
[
(B)
1
1  (1  h)N
(1 + )(1  )' 1  ]
1 
2   q(1)
q
(g + b)' 

1    c (30)
holds, the stable C-mode equilibrium will exist. Note that the suciently small values of the old economy
technology parameter B and the skilled ratio h ensure the above inequality.
As a result, under the parameter conditions under which (29) and (30) are simultaneously satised,
the equilibrium organizational mode changes from the C-mode equilibrium to the D-mode equilibrium
as the skilled ratio increases.
References
[1] Acemoglu, D. 1999, \Changes in Unemployment and Wage Inequality: An Alternative Theory and
Some Evidence," American Economic Review, 89, 1259-1278.
[2] Acemoglu, D. 2002a, \Technical Change, Inequality and the Labor Market," Journal of Economic
Literature, 40, 7-72.
[3] Acemoglu, D. 2002b, \Directed Technical Change ," The Review of Economic Studies, 69, 781-809.
[4] Aghion, P. and J. Tirole, 1997, \Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political
Economy,105, 1-29.
[5] Autor, D. H., Katz, L. F., and M. S. Kearney, 2008, \Trends in U.S. Wage Inequality: Re-assessing
the Revisionists." Review of Economics and Statistics,90,300-323.
25
[6] Bauer, T. and S. Bender, 2004, \Technological Change, Organizational Change, and Job Turnover,"
Labour Economics, 11, 265-291.
[7] Bloom, N., Sadun, R., and J. Van Reenen, 2009, \The Organization of Firms across Countries".
Centre for Economic Performance Discussion Paper No. 937
[8] Bresnahan, T., E. Brynjolfsson, and L. Hitt, 2002, \Information Technology, Workplace Organization,
and the Demand for Skilled Labor: Firm-Level Evidence," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 339-
376.
[9] Caroli, E., and J. Van Reenen, 2001, \Skilled Biased Technological Change? Evidence from a Panel
of British and French Establishments," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 1449-1492.
[10] Dessein, W., 2002, \Authority and Communication in Organizations," Review of Economic Studies,
69, 811-838.
[11] Dixit, A. K. and J. E. Stiglitz, 1977, \Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity,"
American Economic Review, 67, 297-308.
[12] Dustmann, C., J. Ludsteck, and U. Schoenberg, 2009, \Revisiting the German Wage Structure,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124, 843-881.
[13] Haskel, J. and M. Slaughter, 2001, \Trade, Technology and U.K. Wage Inequality," The Economic
Journal, 111, 163-187.
[14] Gorlich, D. and D. J. Snower, 2010, \Wage Inequality and the Changing Organization of Work,"
Kiel Working Paper, 1588.
[15] Ishiguro, S. 2010a, \Contract, Search, and Organizational Diversity," European Economic Review,
54, 678-691.
[16] Ishiguro, S. 2010b, \Organization-Driven Growth," mimeo, Osaka University.
[17] Jerzmanowski, M. and M. Nabar, 2011. \Financial Development and Wage Inequality: Theory and
Evidence," Economci Inquiry, forthcoming.
[18] Kremer, M. and E. Maskin, 1996, \Wage Inequality and Segregation by Skill," NBER Working
Paper, No. 5718. National Bureau of Economic Research: Cambridge, MA.
26
[19] Macho-Stadler, I. and J. D. Perez-Castrillo, 2001, An Introduction to the Economics of Information
Incentives and Contracts, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press.
[20] MacLeod, W.B., 2003, \Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation," American Economics
Review, 93, 216-240.
[21] Marin, D. and T. Verdier, 2008, \Power Inside The Firm and The Market: A General Equilibrium
Approach," Journal of the European Economic Association, 6, 752-788.
[22] Marin, D. and T. Verdier, 2009, \Power in the multinational corporation in industry equilibrium,"
Economic Theory, 38, 437-464.
[23] Nikolowa, R., 2010, \Supply of Skilled Labour and Organizational Change," Labour Economics, 17,
514-522
[24] Romer, P. M., 1990, \Endogenous Technological Change," The Journal of Political Economy, 98,
71-102.
[25] Tirole, J., 2005, The Theory of Corporate Finance, Princeton University Press.
27
HN
wH
C-mode
D-mode
T (wH)
0
Figure 1: The Optimal Organizational Modes
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Figure 2: Free Entry Conditions
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Figure 3: C-mode Equilibrium EC : h = hC
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Figure 4: D-mode Equilibrium ED: h = hD
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Figure 5: Multiple Equilibrium EC , ED, and EM : h = hM
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Figure 6: Skilled and Unskilled Wages
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Figure 7: Within-Group Inequality
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